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ABSTRACT
French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas used rhetorical devices to attempt to overcome the limitations 
of language. However, his use of the “feminine” as a stand-in for alterity creates such an obstacle.  Not 
only does a lack of inclusivity suggest totalization of the Other, it also deeply frustrates the female-
bodied reader’s ability to adopt this ethical behavior in her own life. A woman reading Totality and 
Infinity cannot understand the feminine as alterity, as Levinas asks her to imagine “otherness” as 
herself. She does not see her own gender as foreign to her, and alterity as strictly feminine. In trying 
to envision otherness, she is given only an image of something close to herself. Alterity is an outdated, 
stereotypical metaphor of what femininity looks like, and an inflexible one. The feminine is a metaphor 
for many things perceived as female in a patriarchal society, such as household responsibility and 
sexuality. Levinas’s idea of alterity is highly indicative of a biological woman. The feminine is indicative 
of exclusion from the world of higher thought. She cannot understand how to recognize the Other and 
so cannot fully participate in the ethical relationship by Levinas’s definition. Levinas’s use of another 
gendered metaphor in Otherwise than Being does produce an occasion for intervention: Maternity, in 
substitution of the feminine alterity, is successfully gender-neutral and allows women back into the 
world of Levinas’ ethics. Through this metaphor, Levinas concedes that the relationship he describes 
between the Self and the Other is a perfect one and not easily achieved. Therefore, attempting the task of 
acting maternal to the Other becomes a matter of capability and not gender.
Keywords: alterity, feminine, Levinas, maternity, metaphor
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	 French	philosopher	Emmanuel	Levinas	sought	to	understand	the	atrocities	committed	in	the	
20th century. His work focuses on the ethical relationship and on ethics in general. He examined and 
expounded	upon	his	definition	of	ethics	in	an	attempt	to	provide	his	readers	with	a	way	to	under-
stand how the Other, any person other than the Self, should be treated. He employed several strate-
gies to describe this relationship, including the use of rhetorical language. He focused in particular 
on	metaphors	and	tropes,	using	analogies	to	describe	what	the	ethical	relationship	is	“like,”	as	it	is	
not	possible	to	say	what	it	actually	“is.”	Two	such	metaphors	are	those	of	the	feminine	and	maternity,	
used in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, respectively. 
 One task of modern feminism in to examine gendered language in philosophy, which has his-
torically	been	unwilling	to	include	women:	Aristotle	did	say	that	“the	relation	of	male	to	female	is	by	
nature a relation of superior to inferior and ruler to ruled.”1 Throughout the centuries, women have 
been asked to respond to such language differently. First, they were asked to merely accept that this 
was the way of the world. To accept Aristotle in full, however, is to completely exclude women from 
philosophical	thought	on	the	grounds	that	their	intellect	is	inferior	to	men’s.	With	the	general	move-
ment	toward	inclusivity	over	the	last	century	or	so,	women	are	finally	able	to	participate	in	philoso-
phy, but this language has hardly disappeared. 
 In the world of postmodernism, women are still silenced.  We are now told that the issue of 
sexism has already been solved, that there is nothing more to say on the subject. However, when 
reading	Emmanuel	Levinas,	we	cannot	help	but	wonder	about	his	choice	to	employ	gendered	lan-
guage.	In	describing	ultimate	alterity,	he	used	the	term	“feminine.”	What	makes	femininity	so	re-
markably Other? Tina Chanter, Sonia Sikka, and Claire Katz have argued that he was unsuccessful in 
his	separation	between	the	empirical	woman	and	the	metaphorical	feminine.	Levinas	was	attempting	
to describe the ethical world in his work, and he had to use rhetorical strategies to properly convey 
his meaning. They must clarify his ideas, because if they fail, readers are left confused, and misun-
derstand	what	it	means	to	be	ethical.		Levinas’s	failure	of	the	feminine	not	only	miscommunicates	a	
particular idea, but also misplaces the empirical woman in the ethical world. The feminine does not 
take	an	active	role	in	the	ethical	relationship;	thus,	any	woman	attempting	to	follow	Levinas’	descrip-
tion of an ethical relationship is destined to fail.
	 In	his	later	work,	Levinas	used	a	second	gendered	metaphor,	that	of	maternity.	Lisa	Guenther	
and Jennifer Rosato have argued that this metaphor is successfully inclusive, describing the ethi-
cal	relationship	in	a	way	readers	are	capable	of	replicating	for	themselves.	This	paper	first	explores	
Levinas’s	logic	for	using	metaphors	to	describe	the	ethical	relationship.	The	next	section	examines	his	
decision to focus his philosophy on the ethical relationship and then how he talks about this rela-
tionship	in	the	chapter	“The	Said	and	the	Saying,”	found	in	Otherwise than Being.	The	final	sections	
discuss three of his metaphors, what is successful and unsuccessful in each, and the implications for 
women attempting to replicate the ethical relationship he describes throughout his work.
1. Aristotle, The Politics,	trans.	Carnes	Lord	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1984),	1245b12.
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Why Metaphors Are Necessary in Levinas’s Work
	 Through	a	combination	of	Jewish	philosophy	and	a	personal	distrust	of	ontology,	Levinas	
wanted	to	elevate	ethics	to	“first	philosophy,”	making	it	the	very	focus	of	philosophy	itself.	He	ar-
gued	that	Western	philosophy,	from	ancient	Greek	philosophy	through	Martin	Heidegger,	has	been	
consumed	with	the	task	of	understanding	what	Being	means	and	looks	like.	In	“The	Trace	of	the	
Other,”	Levinas	said,	“From	its	infancy	philosophy	has	been	struck	with	a	horror	of	the	other	that	re-
mains other…. It is for this reason that it is essentially a philosophy of being, that the comprehension 
of being is its last word, and the fundamental structure of man.”2 Philosophy has sought to know as 
much as possible however it can, including understanding individuals as completely as possible. 
	 Levinas	was	personally	affected	by	the	individualistic	and	self-focused	nature	of	ontology	
in	a	most	horrific	way:	He	and	his	family	were	put	into	internment	camps	during	the	Holocaust	in	
World	War	II.	While	Levinas,	his	wife,	and	his	children	were	spared	the	fate	of	many	Jews	of	their	
time,	he	lost	his	father	and	his	siblings.	To	add	insult	to	injury,	his	mentor	and	teacher	Martin	Heide-
gger	famously	converted	to	Nazism.	Levinas	was	left	with	a	pressing	question	after	the	war:	How	
could	philosophy	fail	to	deter	its	most	revolutionary	thinker	to	date	from	joining	the	Nazi	Party?	His	
answer was ontology. 
	 The	study	of	Being	can	be	traced	back	to	the	beginnings	of	philosophy.	Parmenides,	a	pre-So-
cratic,	proposed	that	the	world	“cannot	be	in	motion,	change,	come-to-be,	perish,	[or]	lack	uniformi-
ty.”3 Plato argued that the world is made up of the material and the realm of forms, in which reality 
is an imperfect version of the ideal, thus allowing humans to strive toward perfection.4 The self-focus 
of	ontology	is	apparent	in	Descartes’	cogito ergo sum, where all that I can know is that I am. Therefore, 
all	knowledge	must	stem	from	my	understanding	of	existence.		More	modern	philosophers	focused	
even	more	specifically	on	the	study	of	Being,	including	Heidegger	in	Being and Time. The heavy 
emphasis	on	understanding	what	it	means	to	Be	throughout	philosophy’s	history	affected	even	those	
branches	of	philosophy	that	attempted	to	discuss	other	topics.	Levinas	attempted	to	refocus	the	
entire	subject	back	to	what	he	believed	should	be	the	first	philosophy:	ethics,	or	the	engagement	with	
the Other. 
	 However,	Levinas	could	not,	and	did	not	attempt	to,	completely	dismiss	ontology.	It	is	diffi-
cult to imagine what philosophy would look like if it did not give primacy to the study of being, or 
discuss	and	define	“existence.”	To	understand	ethical	relationships,	one	must	first	understand	who	
the Other is and to whom the Self has a personal responsibility. How could one know how to be 
ethical	to	a	neighbor	without	first	recognizing	him	or	her	as	an	independent	being?	“Does	not	all	
knowledge of relations by which beings are connected or opposed to one another already involve 
the	comprehension	of	the	fact	that	these	relations	exist?”	asked	Levinas	in	“Is	Ontology	Fundamen-
2.		Emmanuel	Levinas,	“The	Trace	of	the	Other,”	in	Deconstruction in Context	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1986),	
346.
3.		Jeremy	C.	Delong,	“Parmenides	of	Elea,”	Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d., http://www.iet.utm.edu/parmenide. 
4.		David	Banach,	“Plato’s	Theory	of	Forms,”	St.	Anslem’s	College,	2006,	http://www.anslem.edu/homepage/dbanach/
platform.htm.
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tal?”5	To	discuss	any	relation	between	two	things,	there	must	first	be	space	for	such	a	relationship	
to	exist.	Recognizing	that	there	is	an	“I”	and	an	“Other”	is	essential	to	understanding	how	these	
two beings interact.  
 To understand what it means to be, however, there must be a focus on personal experiences. 
The	Other	is	therefore	placed	into	a	category	so	that	he	might	be	comprehended.	Neighbor,	friend,	
spouse—these	labels	place	the	Other’s	identity	into	a	preexisting	space,	so	that	he6 can be treated ac-
cordingly. In an ontological system, the Other is treated based on his recognized role because it allows 
him to be understood. A brother is treated in the same manner as a mother and father, for he is immedi-
ate	family.	Ontologically,	misidentifying	a	brother’s	label	may	lead	to	unethical	treatment.	If	a	brother	is	
treated	as	a	neighbor	or	as	a	stranger,	the	ethical	treatment	provided	to	him	may	be	insufficient.		
 Perhaps it is labeling itself that is responsible for unethical treatment. Forcing the Other into 
a role or label in order to give a preconceived type of treatment denies all the other labels the Oth-
er	also	holds.	Levinas	called	this	suppression	of	identity	“violence.”	Committing	violence	against	
the Other allows for true violence to take place by denying ethical responsibility to certain labels. A 
neighbor or a stranger need not be treated as ethically as family in an ontological system, because a 
neighbor	or	stranger	is	not	“as	important.”	Worse	still,	when	a	specific	identity,	such	as	Jewish,	black,	
or gay, is labeled as subhuman, it becomes permissible to treat these lives without respect. A nonhu-
man can be treated violently, and the Holocaust is a prime example of this way of thinking. 
	 Levinas	argued	that	“in	our	relation	with	the	other	(autrui),	he	does	not	affect	us	in	terms	of	a	
concept.”7	He	affects	the	Self	in	a	complex	way,	which	Levinas	explored.	“The	comprehension	of	the	
other	(autrui)	is	inseparable	from	his	invocation,”	Levinas	said.8 To truly understand the Other would 
be to Be him, as true comprehension of him must be as complicated as he is himself. It is impossible for 
the Self to accomplish, and to try to reduce his identity down to an easily understandable label denies 
him	an	existence	outside	of	the	Self’s	experience	with	him.	By	removing	these	labels,	every	category	of	
human becomes regarded as equally as important: Only then can ethics can take precedence.
	 The	ethical	relationship	is	primarily	based	on	an	understanding	of	the	Other,	and	how	Levi-
nas described the relationship with the Other changed over time. In Totality and Infinity,	first	pub-
lished	in	1961,	Levinas’s	definition	of	ethics	had	yet	to	take	on	the	more	extreme	nature	of	some	of	
his later writings, including Otherwise than Being. Ethics in Totality and Infinity involves my response 
to the Other. I am always faced with the call of the Other, who asks me to feed him, to nourish him, 
and	provide	for	him.	I	am	able	to	respond	to	the	Other	through	“enjoyment,	possession,	labor,	and	
habitation,”	said	Morgan	in	his	introduction	to	Levinas’s	work,	because	these	things	create	a	space,	a	
separation	that	“becomes	the	framework	in	which	language,	discourse,	description,	perception,	and	
5.	Emmanuel	Levinas,	“Is	Ontology	Fundamental?”	In	Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. 
Peperzak,	Simon	Critchley,	and	Robert	Bernasconi	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	1996),	2.	
6.	For	consistency	with	Levinas’	methodology,	I	refer	to	the	Other	as	“him”	throughout	this	text.	
7.	Levinas,	“Is	Ontology	Fundamental?”	2.
8. Ibid.
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so forth can take place.”9	I	find	my	responsibility	through	the	things	that	nourish	and	sustain	me,	
like	“air,	light,	spectacles,	sleep,	and	so	on.”10 I respond to the ethical demands of the Other through 
many	different	forms,	most	specifically	through	the	form	in	which	he	requires	my	communication.	At	
the same time, responsibility is communicated to me through everyday experience.  
 In Otherwise than Being,	published	in	1968,	Levinas	called	responsibility	to	the	Other	“substi-
tution,” meaning that to fully answer the call of the Other, I must completely abandon my own inter-
ests and take on the needs of the Other. Instead of being able to answer the call through nourishment, 
through	the	positivity	of	enjoyment,	the	Self	has	become	“hostage”	to	the	Other,	unable	to	assume	
anything less than total responsibility for his needs. The Self completely replaces its needs for those 
of the Other, making ethics in Otherwise than Being	the	most	responsible	form	of	Levinas’s	ethics	to	
date.	Thus,	substitution	is	a	more	demanding	type	of	ethics	than	what	Levinas	described	in	Totality 
and Infinity, in which hospitality is not replaced but is instead exaggerated to create a hostage Self. 
The Said and the Saying
	 Levinas	was	not	always	successful	in	defining	the	perfect	ethical	relationship,	as	he	admitted	
in	“The	Said	and	the	Saying,”	a	chapter	in	Otherwise than Being. Over the years, feminists reading 
Levinas’	work	have	greatly	criticized	some	of	his	choices	in	language	for	totalizing	women	through	
the	rhetorical	devices	he	used	to	describe	the	ethical	relationship.	Two	such	choices	occur	in	“The	
Said and the Saying” and Totality and Infinity: those of maternity and femininity.
	 The	two	texts	feature	significant	differences	that	may	also	help	explain	why	the	later	text	has	
an	exaggerated	version	of	ethics.	Because	he	intended	for	first	philosophy	to	become	ethics,	Levinas	
believed that the way that philosophy is discussed must change. We have to use language to talk 
about	philosophy,	but	language	is	inherently	ontological,	in	that	everything	we	say	fits	into	cate-
gories	so	that	we	can	understand	it.	However,	Levinas	believed	that	the	totality	of	a	human	cannot	
be	described	with	language,	as	“it	is	not	that	the	essence	qua	persistence	in	essence,	qua	conatus	
and interest, would be reducible to a word play.”11 It is impossible to understand the Other through 
language	alone,	so	Levinas	was	forced	to	use	a	different	approach	to	describe	the	Other.	This	new	ap-
proach	extends	to	the	ethical	relationship,	as	language	is	also	insufficient	to	describe	the	Self’s	inter-
action	with	the	Other.	Because	ethics	(in	Levinas’s	sense)	aims	specifically	to	avoid	placing	the	Other	
into	such	categories	so	as	not	to	“totalize”	him,	language	becomes	problematic	in	this	process.	
	 Levinas	used	the	terms	“the	Said”	and	“the	Saying”	to	explain	why	language	fails	to	encom-
pass the entirety of the ethical relationship. The Said is the limitation of the language of ontology, 
“the	content	of	my	words,	their	identifiable	meaning.”12 When I try to express grief to a neighbor 
9.	Michael	L.	Morgan,	The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011),	104.
10. Ibid.
11.	Emmanuel	Levinas,	Otherwise than Being, Or, Beyond Essence,	ed.	Alphonso	Lingis	(Pittsburgh,	PA:	Duquesne	University	
Press,	1981),	5.
12.	Simon	Critchley	and	Robert	Bernasconi,	The Cambridge Companion to Levinas	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	
2002),	18.
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over the loss of a loved one, I am attempting to reach out with language. I want to convey remorse 
and	sympathy,	to	say	that	I	recognize	my	neighbor’s	loss	and	truly	feel	grief	for	that	loss.	What	I	
actually say, however, is never able to fully capture this sentiment.
	 The	Saying,	the	ethical	communication,	is	also	the	ethical	relation	and	is	“antecedent	to	the	
verbal signs it conjugates.”13 The Saying is my interaction with the Other. It is my ethical relationship 
with	the	Other,	“my	exposure—both	corporeal	and	sensible—to	the	other	person.”14 When I speak to 
the Other, I participate in some sort of relationship with him, and the Saying is the way my respon-
sibility reaches me through discourse. It comes through in conversation, even if it is not necessarily 
directly	communicated.	The	Saying	is	also	proximity,	according	to	Levinas,	because	the	Saying,	and	
language in general, is what places me in front of the Other. How else could the call be communicat-
ed	if	not	through	discourse?	“The	original	or	pre-original	saying,	what	is	put	forth	in	the	forward,”	
Levinas	said,	“weaves	an	intrigue	of	responsibility.”15 The Other does not actually have to tell me I 
am responsible to make me so, but any kind of communication will automatically create this respon-
sibility. The Saying is conceptual, as it is in the use of language that my responsibility is conveyed. 
My	conversation	with	the	Other	brings	me	into	contact	with	responsibility	but	does	not	necessarily	
require the message to be stated in order to be true. 
	 To	clarify	his	idea	of	what	the	Saying	represents,	Levinas	further	stated	that	the	Saying	is	“the	
very	signifyingness	of	signification.”16	The	Saying	is	what	gives	the	signification	its	ability	to	signify;	
without	it,	there	is	no	signification.	It	is	through	discourse	that	I	learn	about	responsibility,	which	is	
meaning	itself	to	Levinas.	Any	sort	of	communication	with	an	Other	is	a	call	to	ethical	action,	which	
is	meaning	itself	to	Levinas.	Without	an	existing	relationship,	nothing	could	be	communicated,	and	
what is communicated is of the highest importance. 
	 Levinas	believed	that	the	only	way	to	attempt	to	overcome	the	cooption	of	the	Saying	by	the	
Said is through the strategic use of rhetoric, like metaphors and tropes, which he used liberally in his 
writing.	There	is	no	way	to	fully	escape	the	cooption	by	the	Said,	but	Levinas	believed	that	the	use	
of rhetorical language allows us to work around the issue, if only partially. When rhetorical devices 
are used, there is a method by which to speak about a subject that allows the listener to determine a 
meaning	that	is	not	necessarily	stated.	Levinas	used	metaphors,	analogies,	and	tropes	to	try	to	speak	
ethically, rather than ontologically. He pushed language to become ethical despite its ontological 
nature, manipulating it and turning it on itself to talk about the indescribable. 
 However, this method is not able to escape the problems of language, as it is still chained to 
the	realm	of	ontology.	Levinas	could	not	create	a	new	method	of	expression	that	would	allow	for	a	
different kind of communication. Instead, he manipulated language that already exists to create a 
better method by which to speak about ethics. 
13.	Levinas,	Otherwise than Being,	5
14.	Critchley	and	Bernasconi,	8.
15.	Levinas,	Otherwise than Being,	5–6.
16.	Ibid.,	5.	
38
 In Otherwise than Being,	Levinas	conceded	that	he	will	fail	in	his	attempt	to	completely	com-
municate	his	meaning.	He	has	to:	Language	is	ontological,	and	he	wanted	to	speak	about	ethics.	He	
said,	“The	correlation	of	the	saying	and	the	said,	that	is,	the	subordination	of	the	saying	to	the	said,	to	
the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that manifestation demands. In language qua said 
everything is conveyed before us, be it at the price of a betrayal.”17 Thus, the price of using language 
is that there is always subordination to ontology. We have to use it, but it always comes at a price. 
While	Levinas	had	to	use	the	Said	to	communicate	the	Saying,	he	wanted	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	did	
not confuse his description of the ethical relationship. Consequently, he chose to use metaphors and 
other	rhetorical	devices.	The	question	becomes	whether	or	not	Levinas	was	able	to	get	the	Saying	
across without overusing the Said. How effective are his metaphors? Did he manage to successfully 
explain the essence of ethics using rhetorical devices? The answer is not clear. For example, the next 
section shows that in Totality and Infinity,	Levinas’s	use	of	the	feminine	is	ineffective.	He	failed	to	
separate the Said from the Saying, and readers cannot develop an accurate idea of how alterity in an 
ethical relationship works. 
The Metaphor of the Feminine
 In Totality and Infinity,	Levinas	attempted	to	convey	the	concept	of	alterity	through	the	use	of	
a	metaphor:	the	“feminine.”	This	section	explores	whether	the	discrepancy	between	Levinas’	Saying,	
conveying alterity, and his Said, expressed through the metaphor of the feminine, is a wide enough 
gap	to	frustrate	Levinas’	Saying	to	a	point	of	unintelligibility.	Further,	this	section	asks	whether	Levi-
nas’s	Said	is	detrimental	to	his	philosophy.	If	the	feminine	does,	in	fact,	convey	a	sexist	notion,	does	
this mean that women are excluded from the world of ethics? 
 In Time and the Other,	Levinas	said,	“The	feminine	is	not	merely	the	unknowable,	but	a	mode	
of being that consists in slipping away from the light…. Hiding is the way of existing of the femi-
nine, and this fact of hiding is precisely modesty.”18	This,	like	other	parts	of	Levinas’	philosophy,	is	
a positive view of women, or at least the feminine, at face value. It is only after breaking down what 
makes the feminine ultimately other that the patriarchal message underneath is revealed. Partially, 
the feminine is described as the embodiment of mystery because she seems to live unconcerned with 
the	infinite,	the	scholarly,	and	the	abstract.	She	becomes	a	“retreat	home	with	oneself	as	in	a	land	of	
refuge,”	said	Levinas.19	She	serves	as	what	Sonia	Sikka	referred	to	as	a	“break,”	an	“interruption	in	
the	continuity	of	the	‘virile’	existence.”20 
	 However,	she	also	serves	a	pivotal	role	in	Levinas’	philosophy.	She	allows	the	Self	to	realize	
ultimate alterity, to recognize the absolutely different. It is only through the feminine that transcen-
17.	Levinas,	Otherwise than Being, 6.
18.	Emmanuel	Levinas,	Emmanuel Levinas: Time and the Other [and Additional Essays],	trans.	Richard	A.	Cohen	(Pittsburgh:	
Duquesne	University	Press,	1987),	87.
19.	Levinas,	Totality and Infinity,	156.
20.	Sonia	Sikka,	“The	Delightful	Other:	Portraits	of	the	Feminine	in	Kierkegaard,	Nietzsche,	and	Levinas,”	in	Feminist 
Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas,	comp.	Tina	Chanter	(University	Park:	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2001),	102.
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dence is achieved for the subject because her radical otherness exposes the Self to the Other. She is so 
different that the Self sees the clear separation between them, and can then recognize similar separa-
tions	between	its	own	being	and	others.	“She—or	at	least	the	dimension	of	the	feminine—breaks	the	
obsession of his self-assertive concern with his own projects and, through the gentleness of her wel-
come, points him toward the possibility of the ethical,” Sikka argued.21	Because	the	feminine	is	used	
by the masculine to achieve the ethical, this form of transcendence is not available to the feminine. 
The feminine is but preparation for the masculine, providing him with the means to ethics without 
access	to	ethics	herself.	While	the	masculine	is	allowed	to	use	the	feminine	in	this	way,	Levinas	did	
not include room for any sort of similar, but opposite, option to be realized. The masculine does not 
promote the ethical relationship for the feminine in the way that the feminine does for the masculine. 
Thus, the door of possibility for the feminine to participate in ethics is closed, as she never realizes 
the	essential	truths	that	the	masculine	does.	Without	exposure	to	“otherness,”	she	never	recognizes	
the	responsibility	that	she	has	as	a	part	of	Levinas’s	system.	In	fact,	most	of	what	the	feminine	does	
is	without	conscious	effort.	The	only	role	she	has	in	ethics	is	accidental.	In	Sikka’s	words,	“Far	from	
leaving	blank	the	space	titled	‘woman’	and	inviting	her	to	fill	it	in	herself,	Levinas	writes	all	over	this	
space, inscribing it with his desires, his needs, his missions, in terms of which the feminine is never a 
for-the-sake-of, but always an in-order-to, a means rather than an end.”22 
 Tina Chanter, in her book Time, Death, and the Feminine,	said	that	Levinas	“seems	to	disqualify	
the	feminine	from	ethics	as	such	rejoining	Hegel’s	attribution	of	the	feminine	to	the	private	realm	of	
the domestic, while the masculine principle is represented by the truly ethical, and therefore with the 
third part, the political, the public—with reason, with philosophy, with justice.”23 Thus, by assigning 
the	feminine	worth	only	in	its	capability	to	create	an	interest	in	the	ethical,	Levinas	denied	actual	
women	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	what	has	heretofore	been	the	realm	of	“the	masculine,”	such	
as politics, philosophy, and justice. 
	 Levinas	himself	never	identified	“the	feminine”	biologically.	In	fact,	because	he	was	employing	
the trope of the feminine to identify alterity for the Self, he was not actively associating the feminine 
with the biological woman. The feminine was meant to be representative, a thing to show something 
else:	in	this	case,	for	Levinas,	how	to	reach	alterity.	His	rhetorical	use	of	the	feminine	to	represent	the	
complex	idea	of	alterity	was	not	meant	to	be	literal,	but	metaphorical.	His	use	of	the	word	“feminine”	
as	a	metaphor	for	alterity	is	an	example	of	Levinas	employing	the	Saying	and	the	Said.	
 Some authors certainly agree that the feminine is not a representation of the empirical wom-
an. Richard Cohen, in his book Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas,	said,	“Iden-
tifying or specifying the particular type of personal alterity constitutive of habitation—gentle, shel-
tering,	familiar,	intimate—with	the	term	of	‘feminine,’	used	metaphorically,	is	a	purely	conventional	
gesture,	like	the	expression	‘mother	nature.’”24	He	argued	that	there	is	nothing	about	Levinas’	use	of	
21. Ibid., 103.
22. Ibid.
23. Tina Chanter, Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2001),	73.
24. Richard A. Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas	(Chicago:	University	of		 Chicago	Press,	
1994),	198.
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the	feminine	to	suggest	that,	unconsciously	or	not,	the	philosopher	directly	identified	this	element	of	
alterity	with	the	empirical	woman.	Similarly,	author	Irina	Poleshchuk	argued	that	“the	feminine	is	
not	defined	in	terms	of	an	opposition	to	the	masculine,	and	because	it	is	pure	alterity,	it	presupposes	
a different kind of relation which cannot be disclosed in terms of the masculine and the feminine.”25 
In	Poleshchuk’s	opinion,	masculinity	and	femininity	do	not	have	opposing	definitions.	The	feminine	
is not meant to be the antithesis of the masculine, but is separate from such a relationship entirely, 
existing on its own. To Poleshchuk, this means that the feminine is not representative of the woman. 
In order to be so, the feminine would have to be the opposite of the masculine. 
 However, feminist authors such as Claire Katz, Tina Chanter, and Sonia Sikka have argued 
more	effectively	that	Levinas’s	overuse	of	stereotypes	to	describe	the	feminine	conflates	his	definition	
of	feminine	with	the	empirical	definition	of	the	woman.	Claire	Katz	argued	that	“throughout	Difficult 
Freedom, just as in Totality and Infinity,	there	is	an	equivocation	between	the	‘feminine’	and	‘woman’	
that	would	indicate	that	feminine	is	not	a	mere	adjective	for	female	traits	but	also	signifies	the	fe-
male sex.”26	These	traits	include	domesticity,	mystery,	and,	perhaps	most	significantly,	eros.	By	eros,	
Levinas	meant	the	classical	notion	of	passionate	love,	the	erotic	relationship.	Sonia	Sikka	believed	
that	“metaphors	matter,”	stating	that	he	made	a	mistake	when	“Levinas	says	‘the	feminine’	when	he	
could say exclusively ‘the erotic relation.”27 She also pointed out that a woman would most likely not 
identify	the	erotic	relation	as	feminine.	“She	would	say	‘the	erotic	relation,’	not	the	‘masculine’;	she	
would	say,	‘the	object	of	eros,’	not	‘man.’”28 Thus, unintentionally, the feminine becomes a standing 
word	for	the	metaphysical	woman.	Levinas	chose	to	use	the	word	“feminine”	to	indicate	women,	not	
just	feminine	traits.	Katz,	Sikka,	and	Chanter	have	concluded	that	the	traits	Levinas	identified	as	the	
“feminine”	are	patriarchal	and	therefore	anti-feminist.
	 Levinas	used	the	“feminine”	to	describe	a	complex	concept	in	the	ethical	relationship.	In	
Time and the Other,	Levinas	said,	“L’altérite s’accomplit dans le féminin,”	translated	by	H.M.	Parshley	as	
“Otherness	reaches	its	full	flowering	in	the	feminine,”	but	which	translates	literally	as	“Alterity	is	ac-
complished in the feminine.”29 The feminine helps the Self recognize alterity, but is not alterity itself. 
Alterity is reached in its height through the feminine, and the Self can learn about the Other through 
its exposure to the feminine. The feminine is a combination of multiple terms, meaning eros, fecundi-
ty, domesticity, and mystery: all of which fall within the broader category represented by the singular 
word. These terms all work to serve as a Said that describes the Saying, which allows the Self to 
25.	Irina	Poleshchuk,	“Unfolding	Flesh	towards	the	Other:	Levinas’	Perspective	of	Maternity	and	the	Feminine,”	Problemos: 
Mokslo Darbai	84	(2013):	138–52.	
26.	Claire	Elizabeth	Katz,	“Reinhabiting	the	House	of	Ruth:	Exceeding	the	Limits	of	the	Feminine	in	Levinas,”	in	Feminist 
Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas,	comp.	Tina	Chanter	(University	Park:	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2001),	150.
27. Sikka, 107–108.
28. Ibid., 108.
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ultimately discover the Other. Alterity is an essential piece to the puzzle of the ethical relationship, 
providing the Self with insight into just what the Other looks like.30 
	 By	this	definition,	the	feminine	also	cannot	be	an	ethical	Other.	Instead,	it	is	domesticity.	The	
epiphany	of	the	feminine	is	not	the	epiphany	of	the	face.	It	is	not	the	“vous	that	speaks	and	to	whom	
one owes respect, but the intimate tu	that	is	supposedly	a	condition	for	‘the	interiority	of	the	Home’”.31 
She is not the Other to whom there is a moral obligation, because she exists as the embodiment of the 
home	that	serves	as	a	resting	place	for	the	unceasing	mind	of	the	man.	She	“creates	the	dwelling,	the	
welcoming and habitation, thus providing the means of enjoyment and sensuality that are interrupted 
by the ethical.”32 She is not given her own space and is not allowed to work toward the ethical, instead 
serving her call to the Other by providing the home through which the masculine achieves transcen-
dence.	She	fulfills	her	responsibility	because	she	“makes	possible	the	subject,	or	that	man’s,	participa-
tion	in	the	ethical;	however,	[she]	does	so	without	participation	in	the	ethical	relation	itself.”33 
	 While	the	feminine	is	important	to	Levinas’s	philosophy,	as	without	it	the	call	to	be	ethi-
cal does not even exist, it still serves not for itself, but for the masculine. Its value is in serving the 
masculine, not, as Sikka said, for its own sake. This meaning mirrors a typical view of women in a 
patriarchal society. Women are not assigned value based on their own merit, but on the things they 
can	provide	for	the	man:	children,	comfort,	and,	in	Levinas’s	case,	ethics.	So,	what	if	a	woman	is	not	
interested in providing these sort of things? If her only value comes from her capacity to provide 
such things, what happens when she fails to do so? Suppose a woman whose only worth comes from 
her maternal capabilities in a society where children are highly desired and revered is uninterested in 
having	children,	or	worse,	incapable.	Does	this	render	her	valueless?	Levinas	reduced	the	feminine	
down	to	one	factor,	which	is	to	totalize	by	his	own	definition.	
	 Levinas	wrote	Totality and Infinity before an important conversation in feminism had taken 
place. In the radical stages of early feminism, it was considered devaluing to assume that a wom-
an	would	ever	want	to	simply	have	children	and	stay	at	home.	Levinas,	however,	assumed	that	all	
women want to have children and function primarily in the home. Today, feminism recognizes that 
there	are	several	factors	in	a	woman’s	decision	to	have	children	and	that	it	is	not	ethical	to	reduce	
the	identity	of	the	world’s	female	population	down	to	a	decision	about	children.	However,	because	
a	primary	form	of	thought	about	the	question	of	children	during	Levinas’s	lifetime	was	an	assump-
tion that women would want to give up their livelihoods to have children, it seems only natural that 
he would describe women in this way as well. This is the mistake he made with the feminine: He 
misunderstood the desires of women because of the world around him, and we must reinterpret his 
narrative in a more inclusive way. 
	 Levinas’s	portrayal	of	the	feminine	is	negative	in	other	ways	as	well.	Assigning	eros	as	fem-
inine	is	also	problematic.	According	to	Sikka,	“The	erotic	relation	is	in	important	respects	the	an-
30.	This	definition	of	the	feminine	is	found	in	Totality and Infinity,	in	the	section	“Interiority	and	Economy.”
31. Sikka, 102.
32. Katz, 147.
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tithesis	of	the	ethical	one,”	and	is	described	with	terms	like	“profanation,”“animality,”	“violation,”	
and	“indecency.”34	What	sort	of	statement,	then,	was	Levinas	making	when	he	believed	eros	to	be	
feminine?	Sikka	argued	that	Levinas	found	the	erotic	relationship	vulgar	and	shameful,	with	its	only	
redeeming	quality	being	the	birth	of	a	son	who	allows	the	subject	(always	masculine,	though	not	al-
ways	male)	to	achieve	transcendence.	Only	through	eros,	however,	can	this	be	achieved.	For	Levinas,	
the	erotic	relationship	is	separate	from	the	ethical	one.	It	is	selfish	and	shameful,	and	yet	is	given	the	
designation of feminine. While the feminine exposes the masculine to the ethical relationship, most 
certainly a positive thing, it also distracts and misleads the masculine from its ethical responsibilities. 
It may introduce the masculine to the ethical, but it is also capable of causing a major break from the 
ethical. It is certainly a statement about women to assign the feminine the role of temptress. 
	 Levinas’s	use	of	the	feminine	also	means	that	the	woman	cannot	truly	be	an	Other.	She	is	“de-
scribed	in	terms	of	…	function	in	the	life	of	a	man”	and	is	“confined	to	the	erotic	relation,	a	relation	
outside the ethical.”35 Thus, the feminine does not evoke the same sense of responsibility that the 
masculine	does.	Though	Levinas	may	not	have	consciously	realized	what	he	was	doing,	he	made	a	
distinction between the masculine and the feminine that excluded the feminine from the ethical rela-
tion, other than its involvement in furthering, and sometimes distracting, the relation for the mascu-
line.	Further,	because	the	feminine	is	tied	inextricably	to	the	woman,	Levinas	was	excluding	women	
from the opportunity to be ethical themselves. 
	 What	Levinas	was	actually	doing,	in	a	sense,	was	failing	to	practice	his	own	philosophy.	He	
was interrupting the continuity of the woman by denying her freedom—an act of violence in his own 
sense.	“If	a	description	of	‘woman’	does	not	acknowledge	her	subjectivity,”	Sikka	argued,	then	“it	
is	violent,”	and	this	is	exactly	what	Levinas	did	in	his	writing.36 He could not reach women on their 
own	terms,	and	tried	to	define	them	by	his	own	values,	his	own	ideas.	This	totalization	of	the	woman	
reduced identity down to one element so that it could be understood. He mistakenly reduced the em-
pirical woman down to one category and took away her identity. He failed to see the woman outside 
of	his	use	for	her.	By	using	her	to	provide	a	“break”	from	the	primary	world	of	philosophy,	politics,	
and justice, he was using her as a means to an end rather than an end itself. Sikka described this 
process	as,	“how	x(1)	affects	me;	therefore,	this	is	the	nature	of	x	as	such.”37	Levinas	was	unforgiving	
of	those	who	commit	violence	against	the	Other;	thus,	we	must	do	the	same	to	him	when	he	commits	
violence against the feminine. 
	 Levinas	denied	that	the	feminine	exists	for	itself.	It	seems	that	he	truly	did	not	consider	what	
a woman who did not exist in this relationship might look like, or what her desires might be in terms 
of	the	ethical.	Katz	criticized	Levinas’	views	on	their	own	terms	by	providing	a	Jewish	counterexam-
ple:	the	story	of	daughter-in-law	Ruth	and	mother-in-law	Naomi,	who	live	together	in	Moab.	Ruth	
supports her mother-in-law even though she has no real obligation to her after the death of her hus-
34. Sikka, 101.
35.	Sikka,	103;	Katz,	155.
36. Sikka, 104.
37.	Ibid.,	105.
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band. Ruth goes far beyond her required duties to her mother-in-law and even leaves her homeland 
to	help	provide	for	Naomi.	Eventually,	Ruth	remarries	and	has	a	son	whose	later	descendant	fathers	
David,	a	king	of	Israel.	Katz’s	question	to	Levinas	is	this:	Is	Ruth’s	only	positive	quality	her	son,	a	
distant relative to a later hero? Does Ruth not herself embody the very idea of the ethical relation, 
abandoning	her	own	comforts	for	the	call	of	the	Other?	“Ruth	so	fulfills	the	definition	of	hospitality	
that	she	exceeds	the	traditional	definition	of	a	woman	and	transforms	her	activity	in	the	dwelling….	
The feminine has no choice but to become ethical, to respond to the Other ethically.”38 The feminine 
becomes	ethical	in	the	dwelling	despite	her	supposed	disinterest	in	it,	and	Levinas	unintentionally	
created a way to make the feminine a participant in the ethical relation in spite of the limitations he 
placed on it. Just as the masculine responds to the call of the Other, so must the feminine. The femi-
nine	has	an	active	role	to	play	in	the	ethical	relationship,	if	only	Levinas	would	allow	it.	
	 The	feminist	arguments	explored	in	this	essay	are	not	used	to	suggest	that	Levinas	was	
intentionally or insidiously misogynistic in his writings about the feminine. He did not necessarily 
set out to discriminate, raising the question, how can a man who sets out to end violence against the 
Other	commit	it	himself?	Sikka	perhaps	explained	it	best:	“Levinas	fails	to	see	the	feminine	Other	as	
one like him…. He fails to recognize her as a subject, and to constitute her alterity on the basis of this 
recognition.”39 He believed that the feminine is too different to be like the masculine, and to try to 
force	it	to	be	more	like	the	masculine	would	be	to	commit	violence.	He	believed	that	the	feminine’s	
alterity is to be cherished and honored, and did not consider that occasionally it is the similarities we 
share	with	the	Other	that	help	us	avoid	totalizing	him.	If	Levinas	could	have	seen	that	the	feminine	
is	not	so	different	in	its	desire	to	explore	the	infinite,	the	realm	of	philosophy,	politics,	and	justice,	he	
might	have	avoided	committing	violence	against	it.	While	it	seems	a	contradiction	to	say	that	Levi-
nas overemphasized otherness, when his entire philosophy is based upon otherness, in the case of 
the feminine, he failed to recognize the Other as less other, and more similar, to himself. In so doing, 
he denied the feminine her interest in the abstract, in the realm of ethics. 
	 Because	Levinas	chose	to	distinguish	between	the	feminine	and	the	masculine,	he	unconscious-
ly refused the empirical woman a place in the world of ethics. He never said that the woman is for-
bidden to participate in ethics or that she cannot feel the call to responsibility and choose whether to 
respond to it. Rather, because he denied that the feminine has a desire to participate at all, he excluded 
her	from	participating	fully	in	the	world	of	ethics.	Because	the	feminine	is	a	“break”	and	is	kept	out	
of	the	realm	of	the	infinite—being	satisfied	instead	with	the	realm	of	the	finite—it	does	not	have	the	
desire	to	work	toward	the	ethical	relationship.	Because	the	feminine	is	synonymous	with	the	empirical	
woman,	actual	women	are	excluded	from	the	ethical	relationship.	A	woman	in	Levinas’s	ethics	loses	
her	place	because	Levinas	asserted	her	disinterest	in	it,	whether	that	is	actually	the	case	or	not.	Levinas	
committed totalization against the woman by placing her into a preconceived category. 
	 To	be	a	woman	and	to	read	Levinas	is	to	struggle	against	one’s	identity.	While	a	woman	may	
want to understand how to best reach the Other ethically, it becomes impossible when she is told that 
she represents alterity itself. How can she recognize the face of the Other when it is herself? If we are 
38. Katz, 164.
39.	Sikka,	105.
44
to	buy	into	Levinas’s	argument,	then	women	would	not	participate	in	a	philosophical	discussion	of	
his work to begin with. They would not be able to, as they could never recognize what alterity is and 
never	have	a	desire	to	understand	the	Other.	The	women	who	study	Levinas	defy	his	assertion	that	
the feminine is ultimate otherness by showing an interest in philosophical work.  
The Metaphor of Maternity
	 Levinas’s	metaphor	for	substitution,	maternity,	is	an	entirely	different	sort	of	rhetorical	
device. It is built on an additional essential idea that provides a safety net from the same fall into 
totalization.	Substitution,	which	is	central	to	Levinas’s	notion	of	ethics	in	Otherwise than Being, is in-
separable from maternity. In the most basic sense, substitution is the one-for-the-other. In the ethical 
relationship, the Other gives a call. In such relationships, the Saying, the underlying message, dom-
inates	by	calling	the	Self’s	attention	to	its	responsibility	to	the	Other.	This	call	demands	the	help	of	
the	Self,	demands	that	the	Other’s	needs	be	met,	and	situates	the	Self	as	solely	responsible	for	those	
needs. The Self has the option to respond to this call or not, though the responsibility will continue 
to	exist	either	way.	“Responsibility	for	the	Other	does	not	wait	for	the	freedom	of	commitment	to	the	
Other,”	Levinas	said.40 The Self may be disconnected from the needs of the Other, but that does not 
reduce how much responsibility the Self has to satisfy the needs of the Other. I am responsible for 
filling	all	needs,	even	if	I	am	in	no	way	connected	to	the	reason	that	these	needs	exist.	
	 For	Levinas	in	Otherwise than Being, this responsibility was prior even to the Self, making it 
pre-original.	The	Self	enters	into	the	world	with	the	responsibility	to	fulfill	all	needs.	However,	in	
Totality and Infinity, he said that the Self is not responsible until it participates in discourse with the 
Other. In this earlier work, because the Self cannot be aware of the Other prior to discourse, it also 
cannot	be	responsible	for	the	Other	before	this	discourse	develops.	“Already	the	I	exists	in	an	emi-
nent	sense:	for	one	cannot	imagine	it	as	first	existing	and	in	addition	endowed	with	happiness	as	an	
attribute	added	to	this	existence.	The	I	exists	as	separated	in	its	enjoyment,	that	is,	as	happy;	and	it	
can	sacrifice	its	pure	and	simple	being	to	happiness.	It	exists	in	an	eminent	sense;	it	exists	above	be-
ing.”41 However, by the time he wrote Otherwise than Being,	Levinas’s	opinion	had	changed.	Now,	the	
subject	enters	the	world	and	finds	himself	already	responsible	for	the	Other.	In	Totality and Infinity, 
the	Other	reveals	purpose	to	the	Self	through	face-to-face	interaction,	in	initial	discourse.	Levinas	
called	it	“the	production	of	meaning.”42 In Otherwise than Being, the Self is given purpose through its 
responsibility	to	the	Other,	which	does	not	require	a	prior	interaction	with	the	Other	to	exist.	“The	
responsibility	for	the	other	cannot	have	begun	in	my	commitment,	in	my	decision,”	he	said.	“The	un-
limited	responsibility	in	which	I	find	myself	comes	from	the	hither	side	of	my	freedom,	from	a	‘prior	
to	every	memory,’	an	‘ulterior	to	every	accomplishment,’	from	the	non-present	par	excellence,	the	
non-original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence.”43  The responsibility for the Other in Oth-
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erwise than Being	exists	prior	to	the	Self	because	it	cannot	be	the	self	that	creates	needs	for	the	Other;	
otherwise, the Self might somehow avoid ever truly coming into responsibility if no initial discourse 
ever occurred or if the Self chose to avoid this responsibility by existing outside of normal human 
discourse. These needs always exist, and we come into them. 
 Substitution, then, is the act of answering the Other. It is a giving-over of the Self to answer 
the	call,	to	accept	full	responsibility	for	the	Other.	It	is	the	epitome	of	ethics.	In	his	essay	“To	Which	
Question	Is	‘Substitution’	the	Answer?”	Robert	Bernasconi	said,	“Substitution	is	not	the	psychologi-
cal event of pity or compassion, but a putting oneself in the place of the other by taking responsibil-
ity for their responsibilities.”44 In substituting the Self for the Other, the Self agrees to take all of his 
needs	and	fulfill	them.	It	is	prior	to	the	Self	and	asymmetrical,	in	that	the	Other	does	not	substitute	
himself	for	me	when	I	give	up	myself	for	him.	Substitution	is	the	giving-over	of	the	Self’s	needs	for	
the	Other’s.	
 In Otherwise than Being,	Levinas	illustrated	substitution	with	the	trope	of	maternity.	Actual	ma-
ternity	is	“the	complete	being	for	the	other,”	and	ultimate	vulnerability.45	Maternity	is	a	responsibility	
for	others,	bearing	“even	responsibility	for	the	persecuting	by	the	persecutor,”	the	persecuting	being	
the pregnancy and the persecutor being the child.46 It is pre-original. The mother did not choose to be 
completely	responsible	for	her	child,	even	if	she	actively	decided	to	become	pregnant.	She	finds	herself	
responsible	for	the	entirety	of	her	baby	despite	herself,	because	it	would	benefit	her	to	not	be	solely	
responsible for a child. She may have accidentally become pregnant, making this illustration even more 
effective. In such a case, she is entirely responsible for the very life of another, without even her choice 
in	the	matter.	It	is	“an	abandon	without	return	…	a	body	suffering	for	another.”47 
 For some, this responsibility seems unreasonable. Autonomy is not present in the equation of 
myself, the call of the Other, and my responsibility to him. For a philosopher like Immanuel Kant, it 
would be incorrect to assert that I can somehow be responsible without my will, because responsibil-
ity requires an active decision. For Kant, responsibility could not be forced upon me entirely, unless I 
decide to submit to moral and practical reason. If I want to be moral, then I will assume responsibil-
ity	for	others,	but	this	is	my	choice.	For	Levinas,	however,	this	was	not	the	case.	I	experience	respon-
sibility outside of my will. The Other forces his needs upon me, and I am responsible for these needs. 
My	autonomy	lies	in	deciding	whether	or	not	to	respond	to	this	responsibility.	
	 Like	ethics,	maternity	is	all-consuming.	The	mother	is	responsible	for	everything	from	the	
fetus’s	protection	to	its	nourishment,	from	its	warmth	and	comfort	to	its	basic	security.	The	unborn	
child, completely unable to provide for itself, is totally dependent on the mother. Without her, it 
cannot survive. This is the extreme to which the Self is responsible to the Other. The Self is not merely 
responsible for a few needs of the Other, but is responsible for everything. It must be able to provide 
anything	and	everything	that	the	Other	needs.	As	Levinas	put	it,	“The	self	bears	the	weight	of	the	
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world;	it	is	responsible	for	everyone,”	involved	in	“a	responsibility	without	freedom.”48 There is no 
limit to how much I need to give to the Other, what I must give to the Other in order to satisfy my re-
sponsibility	to	him.	Substitution,	true	substitution,	is	the	act	of	total	satisfaction	of	the	Other’s	needs.	
According	to	Levinas,	this,	of	course,	perfectly	describes	an	ethical	relationship.	The	practicality	of	
such	a	responsibility	does	not	exist;	the	reader	cannot	expect	to	fully	satisfy	the	demands	Levinas	
made	on	the	perfect	ethical	relationship.	But,	in	no	other	place	can	we	see	this	need	fulfilled	so	close-
ly	as	in	maternity.	The	mother	fills	literally	all	of	her	unborn	child’s	needs.	
 Choice is another important aspect of maternity that resembles the notion of substitution. The 
mother is aware that her child is completely dependent on her. She knows that the child cannot have 
its needs met without her and that if she chooses not to provide for her child, there is no way for the 
child to provide for itself. Again, maternity is the persecuted being responsible for both the persecu-
tion and the persecutor. She therefore feels responsibility with intensity. Importantly, however, just as 
in	the	Self’s	interaction	with	the	Other,	there	is	always	the	option	not	to	accept	responsibility	inflict-
ed on the Self by the call of the Other. The mother always has the option to ignore her pregnancy. 
Nothing	is	forcing	her	to	care	for	her	child.	She	could	always	choose	not	to	eat	enough	or	take	care	of	
her body. She could indulge in vices she knows to be harmful to the developing child or place her-
self in dangerous situations that threaten the safety of the child. This is not the same as being forced 
into such a situation. A poor mother who cannot provide enough food for her growing child is not 
choosing	to	ignore	the	call	of	her	child.	But	a	mother	who	has	the	ability	to	provide	for	her	child	and	
chooses	not	to	is	ignoring	the	call	of	the	Other.	In	the	Self’s	interaction	with	the	Other,	there	always	
exists	the	ability	to	ignore	responsibility.	Nothing	will	stop	the	responsibility	from	existing;	the	moth-
er	will	always	be	responsible	for	the	entirety	of	the	unborn	child’s	well-being,	whether	she	chooses	to	
take this task on or not. Similarly, the Self always has the option to ignore the call of the Other, to not 
help in whatever he needs. This does not, however, stop the responsibility from existing. 
 For these reasons, maternity is the clearest and best example of substitution. The mother is 
completely responsible, prior to herself, despite herself. She is wholly responsible, meaning she must 
provide everything for the child. At the same time, she has the option to ignore her responsibility, as 
does the Self in its interaction with the Other. 
	 According	to	Jennifer	Rosato,	Levinas	was	trying	“to	articulate	a	type	of	experience	that	does	
not rely in part on the initiative of a conscious subject.”49	The	mother,	the	subject,	is	“completely	pas-
sive;	the	structure,	content,	and	cause	of	the	experience	would	all	come	from	an	external	source.”50 
The external source, in the case of maternity, is the child. The mother is responsible without being 
able	to	make	a	decision	in	the	matter;	she	is	forced	to	hear	the	call	of	the	Other	in	her	unborn	child,	
even if she should choose not to respond to it. A pregnant woman is aware that the child inside her 
is	dependent	on	her	entirely,	unable	even	to	feed	itself,	and	that	her	actions	affect	the	child’s	health	
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and	well-being.	She	decides	whether	or	not	to	answer	the	unborn	child’s	needs,	but	she	does	not	
have a choice in the matter of responsibility itself. She is responsible, even if she chooses to ignore 
this responsibility. Similarly, with substitution, the Self is incessantly responsible for the Other. This 
responsibility is also a kind of radical passivity, completely independent of the will of the Self. I can-
not	choose	whether	or	not	I	want	to	be	responsible	for	the	Other;	I	simply	am.	According	to	Rosato,	
Levinas	used	maternity	as	a	trope	for	substitution	because	it	is	a	clear	metaphor	for	this	passivity	
with which the subject is made to be responsible. One lacks control over a strong and important duty 
to another. 
	 Rosato	believed	that	Levinas	also	used	maternity	to	describe	vulnerability.	Vulnerability	is	
when	“the	whole	self	enters	into	relation	with	the	Other	as	a	being	‘for-the-other’—that	is,	a	being	
susceptible	to	the	Other’s	initiative.”51	Maternity	is	a	total	being	“for-the-other,”	and	therefore,	a	
“perfect	image	of	vulnerability	in	Levinas’s	sense	because	of	the	physical	susceptibility	of	a	mother’s	
body	to	the	‘other’—that	is,	the	child—whom	she	carries.”52 The child uses her, whether or not she 
chooses to respond to the call. 
	 Feminist	objections	to	the	trope	of	maternity	are	quickly	directed	at	the	mother’s	obligation	
to	her	child.	She	is	told	to	completely	sacrifice	herself	for	the	sake	of	the	child.	If	she	is	to	completely	
respond to the call of her child, she is completely passive, totally vulnerable to her child. Rosato, in 
contrast,	thought	that	maternity	found	its	way	into	Otherwise	than	Being	precisely	because	it	is	a	
special,	all-consuming	sort	of	passivity	and	responsibility:	“Here,	Levinas	emphasizes	and	develops	
his	idea	that	ethical	responsibility	is	a	‘substitution’	for	the	Other,	a	kenotic	suffering-in-the-place-
of-the-Other	wherein	‘the	oneself’	is	both	emptied	of	its	egotistical	spontaneity	and	re-established	
as a conscious self that is free only insofar as it directs itself toward ethical living.”53	Not	only	is	the	
individual responsible, the Self is so entirely consumed with responsibility that no other alternative 
exists.	To	not	answer	the	call	is	to	still	respond.	The	responsibility	exists,	regardless	of	one’s	will,	and	
imposes	on	the	Self	at	all	times.	If	I	choose	not	to	answer,	I	am	responding.	My	response	is	inaction.	
There is no way to not respond to the call. Freedom, however, comes only in actively answering the 
call.	For	Levinas,	the	metaphor	that	most	clearly	represents	this	idea	is	maternity.	The	feminist	objec-
tion,	then,	is	that	not	all	mothers	are	self-sacrificing.	“One	initial	objection,”	Rosato	said,	“is	that	[ma-
ternity] trades on a stereotypical portrait of the mother as passive or submissive, strong only insofar 
as	she	sacrifices	herself	for	her	children.”54	Similarly,	Lisa	Guenther	said	that	this	idea	of	sacrifice	
plays	on	stereotypes	about	women:	“Women	have	long	been	expected	to	give	without	the	expecta-
tion of return.”55	Surely,	Levinas’s	idea	of	maternity	to	represent	passivity	could	be	problematic	to	his	
female readers, who might be mothers themselves. 
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 However, maternity is successful as a trope because it is gender-neutral in a way that the 
feminine	is	not.	Maternity	is	not	reserved	purely	for	women,	the	way	the	feminine	is	purely	repre-
sentational	of	the	woman.	According	to	Lisa	Gunther,	Levinas’s	use	of	the	phrase	“like	a	maternal	
body,”	“may	or	may	not	refer	to	the	biological	birth	of	the	child,	for	I	can	become	‘like’	a	maternal	
body whether or not I physically give birth.”56	The	trope	is	also	capable	of	representing	a	man.	Levi-
nas	referred	to	the	book	of	Numbers	11:12,	the	story	of	Moses,	who	is	responsible	for	the	people	“I	
have	neither	conceived	nor	given	birth	to.”	Anyone	can	be	“like”	a	mother,	even	men.	While	Levinas	
designated the feminine as a trait reserved for women, he avoided this problem in the maternal. A 
man	can	practice	this	perfect	form	of	substitution,	but	only	if	he	becomes	like	the	maternal	body.	By	
contrast, a man cannot be like the feminine because the masculine holds a much different place than 
the feminine and exists in opposition to the feminine. If the feminine is the empirical woman, then 
the masculine must be the empirical man. 
 Rosato asserted that what allows the rhetoric of maternity to exist comfortably outside of this 
criticism	is	that	Levinas	offered	a	metaphor	that	is	in	some	ways	more	perfect	in	its	exact	execution	
than	is	normally	possible.	Levinas	emphasized	that	people	are	supposed	to	be	a	certain	way,	to	hold	
ethics	as	the	ultimate	goal,	but	that	it	is	impossible	to	ever	completely	fulfill	the	responsibility	of	
responding	to	the	call	of	the	Other.	No	one	is	ever	able	to	actually	fulfill	their	responsibility	complete-
ly.	This	does	not	mean	that	a	person	should	not	try,	however.	According	to	Lisa	Guenther,	“Ethics	is	
not a matter of what I can do, but rather what I ought to do.”57	The	self-sacrificing	mother	is	a	good	
metaphor for substitution in that she is radically passive and chooses to respond. She is radically 
passive not because she does not respond, but because she allows her needs to be substituted for the 
needs of her unborn child. It is her submission to the needs of the Other that makes her passive. The 
mother who gives up herself for the sake of her unborn child resembles the ideal ethical relation-
ship, turning herself fully over to answer the call of the Other. This does not mean that it can always 
happen or that anyone can actually satisfy the requirements of the call. It means only that one must 
try	to	achieve	such	a	goal.	The	self-sacrificing	mother	is	not	what	Levinas	expected	every	mother	to	
be any more than he expected every ordinary, but ethical, person to become saint-like. He recognized 
its rarity and therefore did not hold mothers who are unable to achieve this goal as anything less 
than incomplete in their response to the call, just like the rest of humanity. The metaphor of maternity 
for	substitution	satisfies	both	of	the	legitimate	feminist	criticisms	against	it.	It	is	a	critical	action	that	
is	an	important	step	in	every	person’s	journey	toward	being	ethical.	Unlike	the	feminine,	it	is	not	
exclusive. If one is to be ethical, one must attempt the task of substitution, and no one is excluded 
from this responsibility. Anyone can, and in fact, should, strive for substitution and work to become 
ethical. Women are allowed to participate in the ethical. 
 At the same time, substitution is not a goal that can be achieved. One cannot ever completely 
substitute	oneself	for	another	Self.	I	can	never	satisfy	the	entirety	of	someone	else’s	needs,	and	so	
the	mother	cannot	perfectly	fulfill	the	needs	of	her	fetus.	She	does	not	have	to	try	to	fill	these	needs,	
but	nevertheless,	they	exist;	if	she	fails	to	answer	the	call	of	her	baby,	she	is	failing	in	her	ethical	role.	
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Maternity	is	a	successful	metaphor	despite	this	implication	because	Levinas	did	not	believe	it	is	pos-
sible to completely satisfy the call to the Other, and thus, a mother who is not totally ethical by this 
definition	is	not	necessarily	a	“bad	mother.”	She	is	simply	human,	and	though	she	will	fail,	she	must	
continue to strive to be the closest to perfectly ethical that she can be. 
	 The	feminine,	in	contrast,	is	unable	to	satisfy	its	role	as	a	trope.	Levinas	got	caught	up	in	the	
failings	of	language	in	his	use	of	the	feminine	as	a	metaphor.	Unintentionally,	Levinas	committed	to-
talization against the empirical woman with his use of the feminine as a metaphor for understanding 
alterity. He inadvertently committed violence against the empirical woman and thus failed women 
in	his	work.	One	could	argue	that	the	entire	purpose	of	ethics	as	first	philosophy	is	to	avoid	totaliza-
tion	and	violence,	and	yet	Levinas	inadvertently	committed	his	own	cardinal	sin.	Levinas’s	use	of	the	
trope of maternity, on the other hand, undermines this framework.
	 As	gender	roles	have	changed	and	become	more	fluid,	simply	imagining	alterity	as	the	
other gender has become inadequate. The only group of people capable of seeing total alterity 
as female is straight, traditionally masculine men who identify as their sex for their entire lives. 
Should the homosexual, androgynous human imagine the feminine as alterity, or would it not be 
more	appropriate	for	them	to	see	Levinas’s	target	group	as	ultimately	other?	Could	the	metaphor	
be stretched enough to accomplish the same goals? The answer is no, especially given the impor-
tance	of	gender	in	Levinas’s	understanding	of	eros	and	the	idea	of	the	birth	of	a	male	child	as	a	
pivotal	event	in	the	Self’s	development.
	 The	implications	for	any	woman	or	gender-fluid	individual	reading	Levinas	is	that	they	must	
somehow totally suspend their understanding of the world, try to imagine being a straight male and 
to	envision	alterity	as	if	they	were	this	person.	Then,	maybe	the	Other	can	be	recognized	as	it	fits	
with	one’s	specific	gender	identity.	Otherwise,	we	must	ignore	this	entire	piece	of	the	ethical	relation-
ship	and	hope	the	other	parts	of	the	texts	will	suffice	in	attempting	to	replicate	Levinas’s	ethics.	
The metaphor of maternity does include women in the ethical relationship, but one must wonder if 
a woman could even get this far in the system. If she hits a brick wall at the beginning of her under-
standing	with	alterity,	she	is	unlikely	to	participate	in	Levinas’s	world	of	ethics.	Perhaps	today’s	fem-
inist philosophers will take on the task of creating a new metaphor for alterity that can be understood 
by	other	gender	identities.	Levinas’s	argument	could	be	expanded	to	be	more	inclusive,	allowing	all	
people	to	adopt	his	system.	Levinas’s	philosophy	has	the	potential	to	positively	impact	the	world,	if	
only all people can participate and hear the call of the Other. 
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